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Abstract When policy scholars assess the effects of federalism on climate change mit-
igation, they often look at countries that rejected binding commitments (in particular, the
USA) and find that federalism enabled sub-national entities to partly fill national regulatory
voids. In accordance with a similar case study on Austria, we find the exact opposite for
Switzerland, a country that committed itself to an 8 % cut in 1990 greenhouse gas
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. To reveal the detrimental effects of federalism, we
focus our case study on the integration of climate change concerns into building policies, a
policy field fully in the hands of Swiss sub-national authorities known as cantons. Apart
from a few pioneer cantons, we found mainly federal departments concerned with inte-
grating climate change mitigation into cantonal building policies and cantonal as well as
federal actors struggling with the numerous pitfalls of Swiss federalism in their own ways.
On the one hand, various federal departments tried repeatedly to facilitate a nationwide
greening of cantonal building policies, and their interventions often resulted in lowest
common denominator solutions that were difficult to improve once in place. On the other
hand, Swiss federalism gave a few pioneer cantons the freedom to green their building
policies early on, but their policies hardly diffused to other cantons. Resembling our main
finding of the Austrian case study, we conclude that the 15 % emission decline in the Swiss
building sector during 2008–2012 compared to 1990 levels happened despite, not because
of Swiss federalism. This warrants caution against high hopes in assuming that decen-
tralised or polycentric governance can fully compensate for failed national (or interna-
tional) climate policies.
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Introduction
The effects of federal political systems on environmental policy-making have been studied
for decades without providing clear answers (Millimet 2013). Some ‘‘environmental fed-
eralism’’ scholars explain the mixed findings with the different scales of environmental
problems that should match the level of policy-making: while federal political systems
seem to provide the flexibility necessary for solving local environmental problems such as
water pollution, they seem to be inadequately fragmented for solving national or global
environmental problems such as climate change mitigation (Esty 1996: 570; Macey and
Butler 1996: 25; Adelman and Engel 2008). If the effects of federal political systems
depended only on the scale of an environmental problem, this would be the end of the
story, suggesting that federal political systems are ill-equipped to mitigate global climate
change. However, countries lagging behind in climate change mitigation at the national
level reopened the debate by providing counterevidence. Since the USA never ratified the
Kyoto Protocol (Steurer 2003), several studies showed that its federal political system
enabled its sub-national units (in particular, progressive states such as California) to
successfully fill national regulatory voids (Rabe 2007; Lutsey and Sperling 2008; Corfee-
Morlot 2009). Based on the USA and similar cases such as Canada and Australia,1 one
could conclude that federal states have considerable advantages in mitigating climate
change compared to unitary ones. However, does this impression really hold true for
European countries that have committed themselves to climate change mitigation under the
Kyoto Protocol? For Austria, we have already shown that this is not the case (Steurer and
Clar 2015). Given that the Swiss federal government ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2003,
the key questions to be answered here are: Did the Swiss federal system facilitate or hinder
climate change mitigation? Does the Swiss case confirm our findings for Austria or those
for the US?
Resembling our Austrian case study (Steurer and Clar 2015), we answer this question
with a qualitative case design focusing on policies that aimed to green the building sector
between 1990 and 2012 because it is mainly regulated by sub-national entities known as
cantons. Apart from literature research covering academic studies, evaluations and policy
documents, we draw on 15 semi-structured, standardised face-to-face interviews conducted
in January 2013 with federal and cantonal policy-makers, as well as non-state climate
experts involved in Swiss climate and building policies (see ‘‘Appendix’’ for an anon-
ymised list of interviews). The interview guides were designed to answer our research
question, accounting for the specific expertise of our interviewees on Swiss climate and
building policies. In addition to analysing the integration of climate concerns into the
building policies of all 26 Swiss cantons in general terms, we also had a closer look at three
pioneer cantons: Basel-Landschaft, Basel-Stadt and Bern. We chose these pioneers because
if Swiss Federalism facilitated mutual learning and a positive competition towards climate
policy integration among cantons (for these and other potential advantages of federalism,
see the following section), they would most likely have played a key role in this.
1 Canada formally withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011 but started to ignore it much earlier (see
http://www.cbc.ca/news2/politics/story/2011/12/12/pol-kent-kyoto-pullout.html; accessed 2 February 2016).
Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol only because it was granted a very weak mitigation target that allowed
it to de facto increase its emissions (see http://theconversation.com/australia-hit-its-kyoto-target-but-it-was-
more-a-three-inch-putt-than-a-hole-in-one-44731; accessed 18 December 2015). For the positive effects of
federalism in Canada, see Rabe 2007, and for Canada and Australia, see Gordon and Macdonald 2014.
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Furthermore, we expected them to be better informed and more critical about mitigation
efforts by federal and other cantonal actors.
The following section introduces federalism and policy integration as the two main
concepts of the present paper, and based on these concepts, it also operationalises how to
assess the effects of federalism on climate policy-making. The section entitled ‘‘Constant
federal dripping wears cantonal stones’’ presents the ‘‘nitty–gritty’’ of our case study. After
introducing relevant aspects of Swiss federalism, it describes the main federal-level climate
governance approaches and policy measures that aimed to achieve the Kyoto target. In a
second part, it analyses horizontal and vertical efforts of integrating mitigation concerns
into cantonal building policies. Finally, we discuss our main findings in view of our
research question and we distil three main conclusions and their policy implications.
Federalism and policy integration
Federalism is a basic polity set-up in which ‘‘power is constitutionally divided between
different authorities in such a way that each authority exercises responsibility for a par-
ticular set of functions’’ via its own institutions (Keman 2000: 193 who quotes Robertson
1985). Thus, ‘‘federal polity is characterized by ‘sharing power’ and by ‘dividing power’ in
a vertical fashion’’ (Keman 2000: 193). In reality, this characterisation can play out in
many different types of federalism, and according to Keman (2000), these types can be
differentiated based on who has the ‘‘right to decide’’ and/or the ‘‘right to act’’ on certain
issues. While the right to decide ‘‘refers to the competence to design and pass policies on
its own or in cooperation with a superordinated institution’’ (Biela et al. 2012: 448), the
latter is concerned with implementing policies adopted elsewhere (Keman 2000). For the
purpose of our case study, it is sufficient to emphasise that the key instruments of Swiss
building policies (i.e. building standards and subsidy programs) have traditionally been in
the hands of the cantons, or less colloquially: the cantons are the ones who have ‘‘the right
to decide’’ and ‘‘the right to act’’ on building-related policies in Switzerland that are
relevant to the present study.
The policy performance of federal political systems is a longstanding puzzle of fed-
eralism studies in general, and of environmental federalism (i.e. studies concerned with the
role federalism plays in environmental policy-making) in particular, and it is still unre-
solved. We focus our review on three frequently mentioned pros and cons of federalism
(see also Steurer and Clar 2015). Parts of the (environmental) federalism literature
emphasise the following three disadvantages of federal systems in solving (environmental)
policy problems. First, a failure to coordinate actors and policies between different levels
of government can result in redundant, incoherent or even contradictory and consequently
ineffective policies (Peters 1998: 296; Goulder and Stavins 2010; Galarraga et al. 2011:
165). Second, a larger number of decision-makers and institutional duplicities make it
more likely that policy changes are delayed and/or watered down, which usually implies
high transaction costs (Tsebelis 2002). Third, the economic rivalry between sub-national
entities can result in a race to the bottom of environmental standards, in particular when
this enhances economic competitiveness (Wa¨lti 2004: 603). In contrast, other scholars
found the following three advantages of federal political systems compared to unitary ones
(for an overview see Nice 1987; Adler 2005: 139–157): first, fragmented responsibilities
and duplicities do not have to result in delays or races to the bottom. They may also trigger
experimentation, mutual learning and a positive competition (or a race to the top) by
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diffusing policy innovations between sub-national entities (Kloepfer 2004: 761; Chappell
and Curtin 2012; Millimet 2013). Second, functionalist and economic approaches (in
particular, the fiscal federalism approach) emphasise that regional autonomy can enhance
the flexibility and the fine-tuning of federal policies to regional specifics (Keman 2000;
Adler 2005; Jahn and Wa¨lti 2007: 263). Finally, federalism can bring policy-making closer
to the citizens and thereby improve the acceptance of governmental decisions (Millimet
2013: 34).
Obviously, a federal political system has the potential to both facilitate and hinder
climate change mitigation, and examples such as the USA (see ‘‘introduction’’) and Austria
(Steurer and Clar 2015) illustrate that both can be found in reality. But can the findings on
Austria be replicated for Switzerland? A key to assess the effects of federalism on climate
policy-making is whether the federal polity set-up resulted in mutual learning and
autonomous policy diffusion rendering federal coordination obsolete, or rather in delayed
and/or watered-down policies, triggered inter alia through federal coordination. Conse-
quently, we will pay close attention to who the main actors were in greening cantonal
building policies. If federal (or even EU) interventions played a key role in triggering
policy changes, federalism can be interpreted as a hindering factor that could only be
overcome via coordination from the top. Before we can analyse our empirical material
accordingly, we have to introduce climate policy integration as the dependent variable of
our case study.
As most industrialised countries, Switzerland struggled with implementing effective
mitigation policies, inter alia because it requires often disputed policy changes in many
sectors at all levels of government (Bartle and Vass 2007: 39). Building on the concept of
environmental policy integration (short EPI; Lafferty and Hovden 2003; Jordan and
Lenschow 2010), this challenge is often referred to as climate policy integration (CPI).
While the ultimate purpose of CPI regarding mitigation is to reduce carbon emissions (also
referred to as ‘‘CPI as outcome’’),2 the concept is also concerned with the procedural
aspects of integration (‘‘CPI as governance’’), and the policy instruments implemented to
meet these ends (‘‘CPI as output’’) (Kok and de Coninck 2007; Adelle and Russel 2013).
Usually, CPI as governance (e.g. through coordination and negotiation) leads to CPI as
output (in the form of laws, subsidies or taxes) that (aim to) curb greenhouse gas emissions
(Adelle and Russel 2013). According to the environmental and climate policy integration
literatures, the integration of environmental or climate concerns into non-environmental
sectors depends on all the factors that shape policy-making in general. To put highly
complex policy processes in simple terms, CPI as outcome (or CO2 emission cuts)
depends, inter alia, not only on effective policy mixes (or on CPI as output) and on
adequate governance arrangements that facilitate coordination between all relevant actors
(or on CPI as governance). CPI as outcome also depends on polity issues such as minis-
terial and federal structures (i.e. on who is responsible for what), on sectoral actors and
their (mutual or conflicting) interests (i.e. on who wants what) and on resources, capacities
and power relations (i.e. on who can do what) (Lafferty and Hovden 2003; Jordan and
Lenschow 2008, 2010; Adelle and Russel 2013).
Obviously, the key challenge of CPI in any state setting is to integrate climate concerns
into other (non-environmental) sectors at the same level of government. However, as our
case studies demonstrate, federal countries such as Switzerland (where the federal gov-
ernment shares mitigation-relevant competences with 26 cantons) or Austria (Steurer and
2 Note that CPI as outcome in the context of climate change adaptation is concerned with reducing
vulnerabilities and enhancing resilience.
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Clar 2015), add a vertical dimension to this horizontal challenge, with all the potential pros
and cons briefly reviewed above. Thus, the present paper analyses not only how cantons
have integrated climate change mitigation concerns horizontally into their building policies
but also what role vertical interactions between federal and cantonal actors played in this
regard. In addition, we are also interested in how cantons coordinated their building
policies among each other. Since this usually takes place prior to or as part of vertical
interactions with federal actors, we address it in this context. To better understand these
vertical interactions, the subsequent empirical section first introduces some relevant fea-
tures of the Swiss federal system and then focuses mainly on CPI as governance and
respective outputs.
‘‘Constant federal dripping wears cantonal stones’’: case study findings
According to the Kyoto Protocol, the Swiss federal government had to cut its greenhouse
gas emissions by 8 % for the 2008–2012 period compared to 1990. By 2012, Switzerland
achieved a 6 % reduction in carbon-equivalent emissions, and through the purchase of
foreign emission certificates and the consideration of the carbon sink effects of forests,
Switzerland was able to surpass its Kyoto target by 1 % (BAFU 2013, 2014). Domestic
reductions were achieved due to the 2008–2010 economic recession, to a succession of
warmer winters that required less energy for heating (UVEK 2011; BAFU 2013), and also
through a number of climate change mitigation policies. Interestingly, emissions from the
sub-nationally governed building sector fell by about 15 % during 2008–2012 compared to
1990 levels, despite an increase in heated building space of 35 % since 1990 (BAFU 2015).
In line with the US example (see introduction) and a similarly positive development in the
Austrian building sector (Steurer and Clar 2015), the face value of this performance
suggests that, in contradiction to large parts of the environmental federalism literature (see
previous section), federal political systems are well suited to address global problems such
as climate change mitigation after all, whether the national government is committed to
emission reduction targets or not. As we did for Austria (Steurer and Clar 2015), we now
scratch the surface of this impression by diving into the nitty–gritty of Swiss federalism in
greening the decentralised building sector.
What are the key aspects of the Swiss political system relevant for our case study (for a
simplified overview of the main actors, see Fig. 1)? The Cabinet of the Swiss federal
government, the so-called Federal Council, is the key actor behind horizontal policy
integration at the federal level. It aims to integrate all departmental activities into a
Legislature Plan. Based on this plan, legislative proposals are tabled by the Federal
Council. Several permanent and ad hoc Conferences and working groups ensure that
relevant sectoral (and cantonal) interests are considered. Dominated by federal policy-
makers, this formal process is open to informal networks of cantonal authorities, special
interest and civil society groups (Wa¨lti 1996: 10; Braun 2003; Vatter and Wa¨lti 2003: 15;
Vatter 2004: 86). These often play an important role in Switzerland, inter alia because
policy communities are relatively small (Sager et al. 2014: 355). The key actor for envi-
ronmental issues in Switzerland is, as in most countries, the Department dealing with
environmental affairs.3
3 The Federal Department of Environment, Transports, Energy and Communications, from now on short
Environment Department.
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At the cantonal level, horizontal integration follows a similar pattern of formal and
informal negotiations (Fleiner 2009: 52): each Swiss canton has collegial executive bodies
that negotiate policies with sectoral, communal and civil society organisations (Mueller
Fig. 1 Main actors relevant to CPI in the Swiss building sector
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2014). However, as we show below, vertical interactions between the Federal Departments
and cantonal building policy-makers are more important for advancing CPI in cantonal
building policies than horizontal interactions within a canton.
To accommodate for these vertical interactions and those among cantonal governments,
Switzerland relies on a ‘‘gigantic infrastructure’’ (Tscha¨ni 1987: 90) of coordination that
aims to reconcile cantonal and federal interests (Bolleyer 2006: 8; Vatter 2008: 22;
Fu¨glister 2012; Fu¨glister and Wasserfallen 2014). Because federal and cantonal govern-
ments share many responsibilities, one could even say that vertical interactions mark
‘‘business as usual’’ in Swiss policy-making (Fleiner 2009). While the federation often
holds ‘‘the right to decide’’ (see the section ‘‘Federalism and policy integration’’), the
cantons often have ‘‘the right to act’’, i.e. to implement federal policies (Wa¨lti 1996;
Freitag and Vatter 2002). Even in this form of ‘‘executive federalism’’ (Braun 2000;
Swenden 2006), cantons have a large room to manoeuvre, mainly because few compliance
mechanisms constrain them in ‘‘adjusting’’ implementation as they see fit (Klo¨ti 2001: 21;
Linder and Vatter 2001: 104). Regarding building policies, however, the cantonal room to
manoeuvre is unrestricted because they have the rights to decide and to act on building
standards and building subsidy schemes (Strebel and Widmer 2012).4 Therefore, federal
interventions in this policy field had not been as common as in other policy fields (Fischer
et al. 2010)—at least not historically before the CPI challenge emerged (BFE 2011b).
In 2007, the Swiss federal government completed a constitutional reform and shifted
vertical interactions towards jointly negotiated, goal-oriented federal-cantonal contracts
(called ‘‘convention programmes’’) that usually foresee co-financing (Fischer et al. 2010).
These programmes are negotiated by various political and administrative Conferences that
bring federal and cantonal authorities together (Linder and Vatter 2001: 105). For building
policies, the relevant Conference is the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Energy Directors (in
short, the Energy Conference). Before vertical negotiations kick off, the Conferences
coordinate cantonal positions vis-a`-vis the federal government. To ensure effectiveness, the
Conferences have agenda-setting and monitoring powers in virtually all policy sectors, and
decisions are taken under majority rule. In practice, however, decisions are usually
unanimous non-binding prescriptions (Bolleyer 2006: 12) later turned into binding can-
tonal laws in order to avoid federal interventions (Vatter 1999; Armingeon 2000: 115;
Bolleyer 2006).
The horizontal and vertical interactions characterised above build on a strong consen-
sus-seeking political culture that ‘‘reaches down into every cantonal setting’’ (Kriesi and
Jegen 2001: 276). Nevertheless, reaching common policy goals is often a tricky and time-
consuming process that can entrench inefficiencies, dilute reform efforts and yield incre-
mental changes (Germann 1996; Swenden 2006: 192; Ingold and Varone 2012: 336). In the
past, cantonal heterogeneity sometimes enabled the Federal Council to adopt narrow
federal legislation and even capture what used to be cantonal competences if problems
persisted (Vatter 1999, 2004: 87; Bolleyer 2006: 14; Fu¨glister 2012). Thus, an effective
coordination of positions became an increasingly important concern for cantons to limit
federal influence (Fu¨glister and Wasserfallen 2014: 405).
Obviously, Swiss federalism underwent significant changes in recent years. Although
Switzerland is not an EU Member, the European Union (EU) helped strengthening federal
actors in some instances because the federal government transposes most EU regulations as
a prerequisite for gaining access to the European Single Market. Since the transposed
regulations are binding for all cantons, the ‘‘Europeanisation of Switzerland’’ effectively
4 See also http://www.endk.ch/de/EnDK/Ziel-und-Zweck, accessed 2 February 2016.
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curbs Swiss federalism (OECD 2008; Linder 2013: 192). Let us now analyse how this
federal polity set-up affected climate policy-making in Switzerland in general and in the
building sector in particular.
Governance and policies on climate change mitigation in Switzerland
Swiss climate policy is mainly the responsibility of the Environment Department.
Regarding CPI as governance, it coordinates goals and measures horizontally among its
seven Offices (in particular, among the Federal Offices for the Environment, for Energy
and for Spatial Development), with the other six federal Departments and their numerous
Offices (UVEK 2011: 12) and vertically with the cantons and their Conferences (see the
following subsection; for an illustration, see Fig. 1). For this purpose, the Environment
Department (in particular, the Environment Office) relies on several own Conferences and
working groups (Schenkel 2000: 172). In the past, they sometimes competed with the
Interdepartmental Committee for Sustainable Development headed by the Office for
Spatial Development (Remmel 2012: 4) and with other units from the Energy Office. This
horizontal fragmentation of federal climate policy-making became increasingly
Table 1 Federal climate policies relevant to the building sector
Year Policy Instrument type Relevant sectors Lead actors
1990 Energy 2000
(1990–2000)
Strategy/programme Energy, buildings Energy Office (Department of
Environment, Transport,
Energy and
Communications)
1997 Sustainable
Development
Strategy
Strategy Energy, finance,
buildings
Spatial Development Office
(Department of
Environment, Transport,
Energy and
Communications)
1999 Carbon Act I
(2000–2010)
Law foreseeing
voluntary measures,
carbon tax,
emission-trading and
subsidies
Industry, transport,
buildings, finance
Environment Office
(Department of
Environment, Transport,
Energy and
Communications)
2000 SwissEnergy
(2000–2010)
Programme Energy, buildings,
research
Energy Office (Department of
Environment, Transport,
Energy and
Communications)
2005 Climate Penny
(2005–2012)
Subsidy Development
cooperation,
buildings
Climate Penny Foundation,
then Energy and
Environment Offices
(Department of
Environment, Transport,
Energy and
Communications)
2011 Carbon Act II
(2011–2020)
Law foreseeing
voluntary measures,
carbon tax,
emission-trading and
subsidies
Industry, transport,
buildings, energy,
finance, agriculture,
forestry, research
Environment Office
(Department of
Environment, Transport,
Energy and
Communications)
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controversial, and some interest groups and cantons repeatedly criticised policy overlaps
and contradictions, mainly in order to demand less ambitious climate policies (federal
interviewee). As a result, the Environment Office set up an Interdepartmental Climate
Policy Committee in 2008. The Committee involves the most relevant federal actors (i.e.
11 federal Offices from four Departments) and is open to other federal, cantonal and non-
state experts. Although it acquired considerable competences, several federal and cantonal
interviewees were sceptical about its effectiveness, inter alia because the Committee seems
to favour economic interests. Thus, the Environment Office reinforced its engagement in
existing horizontal integration mechanisms with other federal Departments and/or Offices
(e.g. concerned with energy, transport, finance and economic issues) and alternative
Conferences.
In terms of CPI as (envisaged or actual) policy output, the building sector always played
an important role for federal actors. Although this sector is mainly in the hands of cantonal
governments (see the introduction to this section), federal actors interfered repeatedly with
their own policies addressing energy consumption also in households (see Tables 1, 4). In
1990, the Energy Office passed the Energy2000 action plan to stabilise that years’ carbon
emissions by 2000, a goal eventually reached but not necessarily due to the action plan
(Casado-Asensio and Steurer 2014). In 1992, federal environmental, economic and fiscal
units discussed a carbon tax (Schenkel et al. 1997; Knoefpel 1997; Clivaz 2001: 33), but it
was never adopted because businesses feared losing competitiveness (Ingold 2010). In
1995, the Environment Office drafted a Carbon Act in close cooperation with businesses
(Ingold 2011). To increase the visibility and legitimacy of the Draft Act, the Environment
Office included it in the first sustainable development strategy of 1997 (Schenkel 2000:
171). Notwithstanding this, climate and sustainability policy-making followed different
paths (Remmel 2012: 12): while sustainable development remained a long-term vision,
climate policy-making became concrete in the short term.
In 1999, the Swiss Parliament approved the Carbon Act for a 10-year period. Surpassing
the Swiss Kyoto target (8 %), this ‘‘worldwide rather outstanding’’ piece of legislation at
that time (Kumbaroglu and Madlener 2003: 194) intended to reduce carbon emissions by
10 % by 2010 compared to 1990. The Act foresaw two successive tracks, both managed by
the Environment Office (Ingold 2010: 45) and covering the main emitting sectors (trans-
port, buildings, industry). The first track consisted of voluntary measures for all three key
sectors, notably through the SwissEnergy programme (Ingold 2007: 53, see also the fol-
lowing subsection), and the introduction of two emissions reductions targets: 15 % for
heating and 8 % for motor fuel emissions by 2010 compared to 1990.5 It also envisaged a
green fiscal reform and an emission-trading scheme. The second track (to be introduced
only if the first track failed to deliver) foresaw a carbon tax on fossil motor and heating
fuels (max. USD 2306 per t/CO2), earmarked to finance building retrofitting (see the
following subsection). In 2001, it became evident that voluntary measures were insuffi-
cient, but the Finance Department rejected the green fiscal reform (foreseen in the first
track) and the second track altogether (Ingold 2010: 46). To solve this impasse, the
5 The SwissEnergy programme also aimed to cut carbon emissions by 10 per cent between 2000 and 2010
(baseline 1990), to ensure that total electricity consumption during the same period did not increase by more
than 5 per cent and to increase the proportion of renewable energy as a share of overall energy supply in
Switzerland (see also Sager et al. 2014).
6 All USD amounts in this paper were calculated by the authors based on the exchange rates applicable at
the time of approval of the relevant piece of legislation or publication of document.
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Economy Department7 supported the introduction of a Climate Penny for motor fuels. In
2005, the Swiss Parliament introduced the Penny despite opposition from the Environment
and Energy Offices and taxed a litre of fuel with approx. one US cent. The revenues,
administered by a newly created private body (the Climate Penny Foundation), were used
to subsidise building retrofitting (see the following subsection) and purchase emission
certificates (Scha¨fer 2009: 692).
Since the Penny Foundation scheme posed legal problems (a private entity was col-
lecting a tax that had not gone through a referendum) and proved to be insufficient in
curbing transport-related emissions, negotiations on a carbon tax started after all (Ingold
2010: 52). In 2007, they resulted in the introduction of a heating fuel tax (starting at USD
13 per t/CO2; raised to USD 40 in 2010) and a national emissions trading system for the
Swiss industry (BAFU 2007).
In 2009, the Energy and Environment Offices agreed to renew the Penny, and in 2011,
the Carbon Act was also renewed. In line with EU objectives, Switzerland pledged to
reduce carbon emissions by 20 % until 2020 (baseline 1990). The renewed Act triggered a
few new measures in additional sectors, raised the carbon tax (max. USD 133 per t/CO2 by
2020) and replaced the building retrofitting programme of the Penny Foundation with
reinforced federal-cantonal collaboration (see the following subsection). In exchange for
being excluded from the tax, transport emissions were regulated through the renewed
Climate Penny, voluntary agreements and projects.
This brief history of often controversial and sluggish CPI as governance and as policy
output in the Swiss federal government partly explains the failure to reach the Kyoto target
with domestic measures. The moderate carbon tax that excluded the transport sector was
particularly insufficient to curb greenhouse gas emissions caused by transportation and
buildings (Ingold 2011). By focusing on CPI in the decentralised building sector, we now
explore how the horizontal and vertical dimensions of policy integration played out in a
federal state setting.
Federal and cantonal climate policies in the building sector
As shown in the introduction, building policies play a key role in mitigating greenhouse
gas emissions, in particular in temperate regions such as Switzerland. The two main
building policy options are tightening energy efficiency standards for new buildings and
promoting the thermal retrofitting of old buildings (Metz 2010: 185). Swiss policy-makers
pursued both options since the early 1990 s in order to meet the 1999 Carbon Act’s goal to
cut heating fuel emissions by 15 % until 2010 compared to 1990. During 2008–2012, the
target was surpassed by almost 5 %, albeit also due to non-political drivers (for a dis-
cussion see the final section). This renders the new emission reduction target for the
building sector according to the Climate Act 2011 (22 % by 2015 compared to 1990),
within easy reach. To better understand the driving forces behind this emission decline and
the role of Swiss federalism, this section analyses CPI governing processes (mainly ver-
tical) and the interactions between relevant federal and cantonal policy outputs for the
period 1990–2012.
7 Formally, this is the Secretariat for Economic Affairs.
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Improving energy efficiency standards for buildings
Since the cantons have the right to decide and to act in building policy-making, a patch-
work of strongly diverging regulatory frameworks emerged across Switzerland that ranged
from comparatively environmental friendly regimes in a few pioneer cantons (Basel-
Landschaft, Basel-Stadt, Bern and Zurich) to historically grown regimes that ignored calls
for energy efficiency for a long time in most other cantons. Although inter-cantonal
coordination of energy policies existed since 1979 and the Federal Council developed non-
binding energy prescriptions for new buildings in the 1980s (BFE 2005a, b), these ini-
tiatives were not able to improve the energy efficiency of the Swiss building sector (Braun
2003; BFE 2011a: 33). The situation changed in 1990 when energy policy competences
were broadly enshrined in the Swiss Constitution and federal actors stepped up their
interventions in cantonal building policies since then.
In 1992, the federal Energy Office passed a building retrofitting initiative (see next
subsection), and it facilitated a non-binding ordinance on nationwide building energy
standards (‘‘Model Ordinance for Rational Energy Use in Civil Engineering’’ of 1992; see
Strebel 2011: 467). However, as various federal-level interviewees declared, most cantons
were sceptical: while some stopped attending Conference meetings, most others rejected
the Ordinance because they opposed any kind of federal intervention in cantonal respon-
sibilities. Since front-running cantons (such as Bern and Basel-Stadt) improved their
energy standards on their own and took advantage of the federal programme (see
Sect. ‘‘The energy efficiency pioneers Basel-Landschaft, Basel-Stadt and Bern’’), cross-
cantonal regulatory differences even widened.
In 1998, a federal Energy Act clarified the repeatedly contested distribution of
responsibilities for energy policies (BFE 2011a: 36). Concerning building policies, the Act
confirmed that cantons set and implement the energy standards for old and new buildings
and regulate the use of renewable and non-renewable energies for heating and hot water.
However, it also enabled the federal government to further step up its interventions, e.g. by
passing energy framework legislation, to consult and monitor cantons concerning energy
issues and to support cantonal building policies with federal subsidies and goal-based
global contributions (Strebel and Widmer 2012: 394). As we shown below, federal actors
put this option into practice immediately.
The Energy Act from 1998 also rendered inter-cantonal coordination obligatory, and it
gave the Energy Conference (driven at the time by cantons pioneering energy efficiency,
see Sect. ‘‘What about emission reductions – or CPI as outcome?’’) together with the Swiss
Association for Architects and Engineers an open mandate to negotiate new cantonal
‘‘model prescriptions’’ on energy efficiency (MuKEn; see also Sager et al. 2014). Although
not legally binding, the basic MuKEn8 module of 2000 improved the energy standards of
new and retrofitted buildings considerably, but still at relatively unambitious levels (BFE
2005a, 2011a; Strebel and Widmer 2012; for an overview see Table 2 below). More
ambitious optional MuKEn modules were adopted to give more advanced cantons the
possibility to guide others in going beyond the basic prescriptions, but this rarely happened
(cantonal interviewee).9 Although the MuKEn recommended transposition by 2003, the
8 MuKEn stands for ‘‘Mustervorschriften der Kantone im Energiebereich’’—cantonal model prescriptions
in the energy area.
9 These modules recommended an 80 % cap for the use of non-renewable energy in heating, aimed to limit
the use of electric resistance heaters, and they adopted the privately developed 1998 MINERGIE label for
low-energy buildings.
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implementation of the basic module was slower because it required new cantonal legis-
lation and referenda.10 In addition, differences persisted because cantons transposed
modules differently (BFE 2005a, b) so that harmonisation across cantons was again
hampered (Sager et al. 2014).
Overall, the cantonal ‘‘model prescriptions’’ on energy efficiency and the federal
intervention possibilities represent first breakthroughs in the vertical integration of the
hitherto highly fragmented Swiss building policy field. Nevertheless, the 2002 EU Energy
Efficiency of Buildings Directive (binding for Switzerland) and the 2006 EU Action Plan
for Energy Efficiency quickly rendered the improved Swiss standards obsolete. Arguing
that inter-cantonal harmonisation was not capable of developing nationwide standards that
could meet EU requirements fast enough, the federal government threatened to co-opt
additional cantonal energy competences (BFE 2011a: 38) if the cantons did not make
significant headway in this regard (Sager et al. 2014: 357; federal and cantonal intervie-
wees). Against this background, the cantons agreed to improve their standards faster and
more stringently than with the MuKEn 2000 and a new round of Conference negotiations
started in 2007 (Ingold 2010, 2011). In 2008, an update of the MuKEn was passed by the
Energy Conference 2 years ahead of what was originally planned, to be implemented by
2010. Apart from 50 % stricter building standards (see Table 2), the basic module of the
new MuKEn also included an energy label for buildings (consistent with EU requirements
and with the revised and more stringent passive house standard MiNERGIE-Plus 2001), a
mandatory target for non-renewable energy use that was optional under the MuKEn 2000,
prescriptions for large consumers and a prohibition of electric resistance heaters (EnDK
2008). To empower the new MuKEn standards, the federal Energy Act was revised in
2009, effectively giving more legal weight to the inter-cantonal agreement. Although it is
too early to evaluate the new MuKEn because cantons finalised implementation shortly
Table 2 The evolution of cantonal energy standards for new and retrofitted buildings
Type of instrument and
agreement
Policy instrument Maximum energy
use of new buildings
(in kWh/m2)
Maximum energy use
of retrofitted buildings
(in kWh/m2)
Voluntary policy guidance
agreed between all cantons
Model Ordinance for
Rational Energy Use in
Civil Engineering
(1992)
150 n/a
MuKEn—Cantonal Model
of Energy Prescriptions
(2000)
82 120
MuKEn—Cantonal Model
of Energy Prescriptions
(2008)
48 82
Voluntary label
developed by a few
cantons (open to all)
MINERGIE (1998) 42 n/a
MINERGIE–Plus (2001) 38 n/a
Source: EnDK 2011
10 In 2003, 15 of the 26 cantons had implemented the basic module and 8 other modules. By 2007, the
respective figures were 25 and 16 (BFE 2003, 2008).
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before the end of this study, policy-makers expect the impact to be substantial (BFE 2011a;
Sager et al. 2014).
For this subsection, we conclude that inter-cantonal disagreement on building standards
slowed the harmonisation process aiming for CPI as output and that federal as well as EU
interventions were necessary to bring about noteworthy policy changes.
Retrofitting programmes
As with setting building standards, promoting retrofitting was originally the sole respon-
sibility of the cantons, but only the few energy efficiency pioneers introduced respective
programmes early on (see the following subsection). Thus, the constitutional reform of
1990 prepared the ground for a more active role of the federal government also in this area
(BFE 2011a). The Energy 2000 action plan negotiated by the federal Energy Office and the
Energy Conference, for example, included not only new building standards (see above); it
also aimed to promote the retrofitting of buildings by providing federal subsidies. Since
federal funds had to be matched with cantonal subsidies, the pioneer cantons modified their
own retrofitting programmes in line with federal requirements, and only a few others
launched new ones (Basel-Landschaft, Fribourg, Lucerne, St Gallen). While evaluations
show that federal funds had accelerated retrofitting in participating cantons, the majority
showed no interest in the federal programme (BFE 2011a).
Based upon the Energy Act of 1998, the Energy Office replaced Energy 2000 with the
broader Swiss Energy programme (‘‘EnergieSchweiz’’) in the year 2000. Among other
things, it continued to co-finance retrofitting programmes in cantons that were willing to
adopt at least the MuKEn 2000 standards for retrofitted buildings until a new programme
was established. SwissEnergy also promoted policy learning and community building
among cantonal and federal authorities, and it helped to negotiate so-called convention
programmes that were essentially ‘‘contracts’’ between federal and cantonal authorities on
goals, metrics and activities to be implemented in exchange for co-financing (Sager et al.
2014). SwissEnergy also strengthened vertical integration and trust between federal and
cantonal policy-makers, inter alia by increasing the involvement of the federal Energy
Office in the Energy Conference (cantonal interviewees). Subsequently, the Energy Office
monitored the implementation of these retrofitting programmes in order to name and shame
participating cantons depending on their levels of activity which were determined through
regular visits and cantonal self-assessment reports. However, Swiss federalism also
complicated this endeavour: since no agreement was reached on the structure and contents
of cantonal self-assessments, reports were so unreliable that some laggard cantons sud-
denly appeared to be among the frontrunners (BFE 2008; federal interviewees). Although
participation in the programme was voluntary and 10 of the 26 cantons remained inactive
(Strebel 2011: 471), energy savings triggered by SwissEnergy have been self-assessed to
be USD 1.55 billion between 2000 and 2005 (BFE 2008). As one of our interviewees
noted, the greenhouse gas emission reductions in the programme are unknown, mainly
because its focus was energy security rather than climate change (at least until the mid-
2000s).
In 2005, the Climate Penny Foundation launched another Buildings Programme that
initially competed with SwissEnergy (BFE 2008: 25; federal interviewee). In order to
avoid redundancies, the federal government first reduced the scope of SwissEnergy (BFE
2005a, b: 9), and 5 years later, it merged the Foundation’s Programme with the mainly
informational ‘‘buildings track’’ of SwissEnergy. Co-led by the Environment and Energy
Offices in cooperation with the Energy Conference, the programme aims to promote
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building retrofitting and the modernisation of heating systems through subsidies provided
by federal and cantonal authorities in equal shares and negotiated in so-called convention
programmes.
While the effects of the merged Buildings Programme on retrofitting rates and carbon
emissions are unclear (federal interviewee), its potential and actual outputs are known.
Since these details are relevant to answering our research question, we have to briefly
review them. As Table 3 shows, the total funds spent increased from USD 101 million to
USD 287 million between 2010 and 2013 (see line d in Table 3), but this improvement
cannot hide the fact that the cantons exploited only 56 % of the programmes’ full potential
(line e). What were the reasons for this underperformance? In the first two years, federal
funds retrieved by the cantons (line b) fell considerably short compared to the federal funds
available through carbon tax revenues (line a) and so did the funds spent by the cantons
themselves (line c). According to cantonal and federal interviewees, cantons found the
conditions to receive federal funding too demanding and often failed to obtain federal
funds. Once federal authorities found out about this in 2011, they eased the conditions
swiftly. This lead to a further increase in federal and cantonal funds spent in 2012 (EnDK
2011: 17, 2012, 2013), but cantons still lagged far behind the agreed 50:50 co-funding
ratio. Only in its fourth year (2013), the cantons were able to tap the full potential of the
Buildings Programme with the appropriate co-funding ratio.
Obviously, the Swiss federal government was the main driver and Swiss federalism the
main obstacle for unleashing the full potential of building retrofitting since 2010. While the
Buildings Programme represents a federal intervention in a predominantly cantonal policy
field, the figures summarised in Table 3 show that cantonal funding (line c) persistently
lagged behind federal funding (line b) and even more so behind federal funding potentials
(line a). Although the programme could have been almost twice as large (line e), federal
funds were at least able to mobilise some cantonal funds for building retrofitting.
So far, it seems that CPI in cantonal building standards and retrofitting schemes hinged
mainly on federal interventions, but what about the pioneer cantons? In how far were they
ahead of federal interventions and, more importantly, able to stimulate mutual learning and
a positive competition among cantons (a key argument in favour of federal political
systems, see Sect. ‘‘Federalism and policy integration’’)?
The energy efficiency pioneers Basel-Landschaft, Basel-Stadt and Bern
The pioneering status of Basel-Landschaft, Basel-Stadt and Bern has a history that predates
climate change concerns. It can be traced back to the oil shock of the 1970s, aggravated by
Table 3 Annual funds for the national part of the buildings programme (in million USD)
2010 2011 2012 2013 Sums 2010–2013
(a) Federal funds available 227 257 182 135 801
(b) Federal funds spent 25 150 192 147 514
(c) Cantonal funds spent: 76 83 91 140 390
(d) Total funds spent (b and c) 101 233 283 287 904
(e) Full potential and ratio of funds spent 454
22 %
514
45 %
364
78 %
270
106 %
1602
56 %
Source: EnDK 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, own calculations (line e and column ‘‘Sums 2010–2013’’)
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the cantonal rejection of nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels.11 The untypical
anti-nuclear legacy of all three cantons (about 40 % of electricity in Switzerland is pro-
duced by four nuclear power plants) forced them to focus upon energy efficiency and
renewable energy in the building sector already in the 1970s. This led to relatively large
and experienced energy units that maintained tight connections to professional associations
(BFE 2008, 2011a: 125, b). In addition, these units were part of overall well-developed
semi-autonomous administrative systems with a relatively strong and autonomous tech-
nical, organisational, professional and financial status (Wa¨lti 1996: 11; Vatter 2004: 87).12
When federal and cantonal governments began negotiating CPI into cantonal building
policies in the late 1990s (see above), the three cantons had an edge over others, and the
Swiss federal system allowed them to keep it. As Fig. 2 shows, with the exception of
Bernese standards for old buildings the three cantons consistently surpassed nationwide
building standards. In addition, they also adopted carbon emission and/or energy efficiency
targets for the building sector.13 On this basis, the three cantons also advocated for higher
nationwide standards in the Energy Conference, for example by exemplifying that their
competitiveness had not been hurt (BFE 2011b: 24–38).14 However, they did not succeed
in significantly improving other cantonal building standards and remain pioneers until
today (Strebel and Widmer 2012: 392).15
The standard-setting picture can be replicated for subsidy programmes: Basel-Stadt and
Bern established them long before the launch of federal interventions (in 1986 and 1981,
respectively). Only Basel-Landschaft adopted its 1994 programme in response to Energy
2000 and improved it concurrently with federal programmes. Between 2000 and 2005, the
programmes of Basel-Landschaft and Bern corresponded with the Swiss average (around
USD 9 per capita annually), and thereafter, they consistently surpassed the average (BFE
surveys conducted from 2006 to 2013). Basel-Stadt had by far the largest programme for
many years (ranging from USD 229–341 per capita annually in the 2000-2005 period,
financed by an incentive penny and a tax on electricity consumption; BFE 2009, 2011a),
with a shrinking tendency (USD 95 per capita in 2010 and USD 74 per capita in 2012; BFE
2011a, 2013).16 In sum, we see that promotions for energy-efficient buildings in the three
11 Prompted by strong anti-nuclear movements and the fact that nuclear power plants in other Swiss cantons
surround Basel-Landschaft and Basel-Stadt, the ‘‘twin cantons’’ enshrined a constitutional ban on the
production and use of nuclear energy in 1984 and 1985, respectively. In Bern, public opinion prevented the
cantonal government to expand the capacity of its nuclear power plant, and in 2006, the canton agreed to
shut it down. This was 5 years before the federal government took the same decision for entire Switzerland
(see http://www.bfe.admin.ch/themen/00511/index.html?lang=de; accessed on 19 February 2015).
12 In contrast, structurally weak cantons (such as Obwalden, Solothurn or Valais) often lack the necessary
expertise to judge drafts or to adopt federal legislation (Linder and Vatter 2001: 103).
13 Basel-Landschaft aims to reduce its building emissions (baseline 2000) by 5 per cent until 2015 (Energie
Strategie Basel-Landschaft 2008). Basel-Stadt aims to cut the energy use of buildings by 25 per cent until
2035 compared to 2000 (Energiekonzept Basel-Stadt 2035). Bern aims to reduce both sectoral carbon
emissions by 10 per cent until 2020 compared to 2003 (Energie Report Bern 2003) and energy use in heating
by 20 per cent until 2035, baseline 2005 (Energie Strategie Bern 2006).
14 Bern, for example, diffused the MINERGIE standard for new buildings to the MuKEn 2000; Basel-
Landschaft and Basel-Stadt diffused the MINERGIE-Plus standard for new and retrofitted buildings in the
optional module of the MuKEn 2008.
15 Basel-Landschaft and Basel-Stadt, for example, failed to spread the so-called Basel way (i.e. to render the
optional module of the MuKEn 2000 obligatory and a stricter requirement for the new central module under
the MuKEn 2008), because other cantons regarded it as being too restrictive (BFE 2011c: 129).
16 In per capita terms, no consolidated figures exist. However, the latest figures available show that the
Swiss average was around USD 16 per inhabitant in 2012. In Basel-Stadt, it was USD 74, whereas in Basel-
Landschaft it was about USD 25 and Bern USD 17 in 2012 (BFE 2013).
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pioneer cantons predated and/or swiftly grew above average in response to federal pro-
grammes (BFE 2008, 2011a, 2011b).
Negotiations on federal co-funding were usually easy for the three cantons because of
their high standards and because they had good relations with the Energy Office. However,
even for them implementing the Buildings Programme that promoted the MuKEn 2008
proved challenging. Officials from Basel-Landschaft and Basel-Stadt criticised unneces-
sary and constraining administrative and procedural requirements. While Basel-Landschaft
promoted the Programme vigorously (EnDK 2010: 14, 2011, 2012), Basel-Stadt switched
to own retrofitting programmes because, as one of the interviewees remarked, the Envi-
ronment Office ‘‘changed the administrative and technical procedures regulating access to
subsidies’’ sometimes ‘‘arbitrarily’’. Finally, the canton of Bern valued the ‘‘multiplier
effect of the Programme and the possibility to pursue its own objectives through it’’
(interviewee from Bern). It negotiated the most ambitious retrofitting programme of
Switzerland. This would not have been possible without federal support because a refer-
endum on a cantonal energy tax (supposed to finance building retrofitting) failed in 2008.
Overall, all three pioneer cantons benefitted from federal support for their subsidy
programmes, and all three played driving roles in successive rounds of inter-cantonal
coordination—but usually only after they were triggered by federal interventions. Nev-
ertheless, the three pioneers were largely unable to diffuse their ambitious standards and
promotion schemes to other cantons on their own. Since the pioneers were helpful as soon
as federal interventions began but did not render them obsolete at the outset, we conclude
that Swiss federalism empowered a few pioneers but did not trigger mutual learning and a
positive competition towards CPI among cantons, let alone a race to the top.
Fig. 2 Evolution of national and cantonal energy standards for new and retrofitted buildings in Basel-
Landschaft, Basel-Stadt and Bern (in kWh/m2). Source: Own illustration based on data from BFE (2005b,
2008, 2011b)
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What about emission reductions—or CPI as outcome?
So far, we were mainly concerned with CPI as governance and as policy output. We now
complete the empirical section by briefly discussing CPI as outcome. In how far did the
policy changes analysed here contribute to the decline of greenhouse gas emissions in the
building sector by 15 % during 2008–2012 compared to 1990 levels (BAFU 2015)?
Unfortunately, Swiss federalism stands not only in the way of CPI as cantonal policy
output. It also hinders the gathering of reliable and comparable data necessary to answer
this question. Although most cantons do not maintain emission inventories (federal and
cantonal interviewees), federal Offices have estimated the effects of their interventions as
follows: improved energy efficiency standards (MuKEn) decreased the energy use in new
buildings by 4 % and in old buildings by 16 % between 2000 and 2007 (EnDK 2008: 35).
Annual retrofitting rates are estimated to range between 0.8 and 2 % (Jakob and Eberhard
2004; UVEK 2012; Ott 2013). Despite the fact that these figures are rough estimates,
federal and cantonal policies certainly explain parts of the positive trend in the building
sector, but the oil price surge after 2008 in combination with technological progress and a
tendency towards mild winters also played significant roles (for a similar but more detailed
interpretation for Austria, see Steurer and Clar 2015). Howsoever, the declining emissions
trend can be explained, and it does not affect our main conclusions regarding the role
federalism played in greening building policies across Switzerland.
Concluding discussion
This concluding discussion distils from the rich empirical material presented above how
Swiss federalism has hindered rather than facilitated CPI in building policies and what
lessons and recommendations we can draw from this. Building upon the introductory and
conceptual sections, we focus our discussion on actor constellations, CPI as governance
arrangements, and the origin and nature of CPI as policy outputs.
Regarding actor constellations, we have seen repeatedly that federal actors were the
main drivers for decarbonising the building sector across Switzerland, despite the fact that
they originally had relatively weak formal responsibilities compared to their cantonal
counterparts. However, federal Environmental and Energy Offices sought to overcome
cantonal fragmentation and sluggishness with constitutional reforms as a prerequisite for
CPI as vertical governance and most prominently with CPI as federal policy interventions
targeting cantonal building policies. The few cantonal pioneers in energy efficiency issues
were helpful for federal actors when pushing CPI onto cantonal agendas, but they were
unable to do this on their own.
In terms of CPI as governance, the key role the federal authorities played in a cantonal
policy field entailed of course intense vertical coordination of federal and cantonal posi-
tions, mainly through the Energy Conference. As shown above, improvements in cantonal
building standards and retrofitting schemes usually depended on federal coordination and
policy interventions, with pioneers being the exceptions confirming this rule. Nevertheless,
we must not overlook a lack of coordination between the federal Environmental and
Energy Offices and their detrimental consequences for cantonal policies. This lack of
horizontal coordination resulted in partly competitive federal interventions (see, e.g.
SwissEnergy and the building programme of the Climate Penny Foundation) and subse-
quent changes which aimed to reduce redundancies. Unfortunately, both contributed to
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creating a ‘‘bad chemistry’’, in particular between federal and cantonal authorities. Against
this background, it seems that federal interventions could have been even more effective if
they were always well coordinated and coherent. Finally, progress in integrating mitigation
concerns into cantonal building standards and retrofitting schemes also depended on inter-
cantonal coordination in which pioneer cantons played important roles. However, even the
coordination between cantons usually improved not autonomously but as a response to new
demands coming from the federal (or EU) level.
In terms of CPI as policies, only a few pioneer cantons were ahead of federal inter-
ventions, while most others remained passive throughout our study period. Instead of
learning from the few cantonal pioneers and engaging themselves autonomously and
proactively with greening building policies, most cantons either ignored or at best slowly
responded to federal interventions. Consequently, a highly complex web of interactions
between federal and cantonal authorities and equally complex relations between their
policies on building standards and retrofitting schemes emerged. Based on the empirics
presented in the previous section, Table 4 summarises the linkages between federal and
cantonal policies on building standards. It shows that the adoption or the implementation of
all five cantonal policy changes can be linked to federal interventions. Not coincidentally,
federal and cantonal governments were both very active between 1998 and 2001, shortly
before Switzerland ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2003.
Overall, our findings on actor constellations, CPI as governance and CPI as policy
outputs do not point towards federalism facilitating mutual learning and a positive com-
petition towards climate change mitigation unleashed by pioneer cantons. Instead, we
found Swiss federalism responsible for incoherent and inadequate cantonal policies,
delayed and watered-down policy changes that did not come from the cantons autono-
mously but that depended on complex interactions between federal and cantonal actors and
policies. Obviously, these vertical interactions were necessary to overcome the obstacles
Swiss federalism posed for greening cantonal building policies: if cantons were the main
drivers behind CPI in the building sector, these interactions would not have been neces-
sary. However, since federalism triggered neither a race to the top nor one to the bottom,
the metaphor that summarises our findings best is federalism as ‘‘a multi-level stee-
plechase’’ that further complicated an already complex policy challenge (for a similar
conclusion on Austria, see anonymised). Since a small country such as Switzerland does
not require the fine-tuning of building standards to regional specifics, the obvious down-
sides of federalism were not balanced by the (potential) advantages of federalism as
summarised in Sect. ‘‘Federalism and policy integration’’.
What policy-relevant lessons and recommendations can we draw from our findings?
First, our findings reiterate a lesson drawn from a similar case study on Austria. We caution
‘‘against high hopes assuming that decentralised or polycentric governance can fully
compensate for failed international and national climate policies. Polycentric governance
arrangements can certainly be effective, but according to our findings, decentralised pol-
icy-making is not necessarily the ideal way to solve global environmental problems’’
(Steurer and Clar 2015: 100)—in particular not when national actors have adopted a global
mitigation accord such as the Kyoto Protocol without involving sub-national actors.
Second, the most obvious recommendation is to centralise responsibilities in federal
countries that play a key role in solving global problems such as climate change mitiga-
tion—at least when national governments have adopted a commitment to curb greenhouse
gas emissions (for the USA serving as a counterexample, see the introduction). While this
recommendation is very unrealistic in other federal countries (for Austria, see Steurer and
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Clar 2015), there is a small chance to further strengthen federal actors in Switzerland
because its federal political system was repeatedly in flux in recent decades.
Third, a key obstacle for facilitating CPI in the decentralised building sector was that
the federal government failed to pass on its national Kyoto commitment to its cantons.
Consequently, Swiss Federalism detached the international obligation from vital cantonal
policies on the ground, and a complex web of interactions was necessary to bridge this
detachment. Consequently, federal governments should synchronise international (or
European) and domestic effort sharing negotiations early on so that sub-national govern-
ments are obliged to meet own targets (Steurer and Clar 2015). The fact that not only
Switzerland but all federal countries in Europe failed to do so until now reemphasises how
lightly governments have taken climate change mitigation targets so far.
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Appendix
See Table 5.
Table 5 List of interviews
Societal domain Level of
activity
Organisation Location, date in 2013
Governmental Federal Federal Office for Spatial Development Bern, 17 January
Federal Department of the Environment,
Transport, Energy and Communication
Bern, 17 January
Conference of Cantonal Energy Directors Zurich, 14 January
Federal Finance Administration Bern, 16 January
Federal Office for the Environment Bern, 15 & 16 January
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs Bern, 15 January
Swiss Federal Office of Energy Bern, 16 & 17 January
Cantonal Office for Environment and Energy, Bern Bern, 15 January
Office for Environmental Integration and
Energy, Basel-Stadt
Basel, 18 January
Office for Environmental Protection and
Energy, Basel-Landschaft
Liestal, 18 January
Non-governmental National Swiss Business Federation (Economiesuisse) Zurich, 14 January
Scientific expert Bern, 16 January
World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) Zurich, 14 January
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